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Abstract
The Howard Johnson’s restaurant chain was one of the first franchise success stories in the United States.
Climbing in size to be over 1,000 restaurants, the chain today boasts fewer than 30 units. How could such a
successful company spiral downward to virtually nothing? This article examines the history of the chain and
offers reasons for its success and demise.
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Howard Johnson's: Rise 
and fall of an American icon 
by William Crandall and 
John A. Parnell 
The Howard Johnson's restaurant chain practitioners, and students can also 
was one of the fi& fmchise success benefit by the ~~~~d 
stones in the United States. ClLnbing in size 
to over 1.000 restaurants, the chain tcday restaurant Fo*u- 
boasts fewer than 30 units. HOW could such nately, there are some good lessons 
a successfu~ company spiral dodownwrd to that can be gleaned as well. ARer 
Mihrally nothing? This article examines the all, a that can withstand a history of the chain and offen reasons for its 
success and demise. depression, a World War, and gaso- 
line shortages in the 'IOs, must 
have been doing some things right. 
T he Howard Johnson's restau- rant chain was once an American icon. Rising to over 
a thousand units, the familiar 
orange roofs, 28 flavors of ice cream, 
fried clams, unique frmkfurters, 
and decent, yet generic food, has 
satisfied weary travelers since 
1925. And yet today fewer than 30 
restaurants remain.' 
How could such a large empire 
crumble to virtually nothing? What 
lessons can be learned from the rise 
and decline? Could any of today's 
large, stable chains be the next to 
fall? Such questions are not just for 
the nostalgic road traveler. 
Management scholars, business 
American icon debuts 
Ironically, Howard Johnson 
entered the restaurant industry in 
order to pay off debts from a failed 
cigar-selling v e n t ~ r e . ~  In 1925, he 
bought a small soda shop in Quincy, 
Massachusetts. The store, left to 
him by his father, sold three flavors 
of ice cream: chocolate, strawbeny, 
and vanilla. He decided to experi- 
ment with the quality of the ice 
cream by using hand-cranked 
makers and doubling the butterfat 
of the product.' The resulting ice 
cream-with 16 percent butterfat 
and 28 flavors-was popular with 
his customers, and sales at the store 
increased dramatically. Johnson 
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expanded operations by opening a 
second store in Wollaston, Massa- 
chusetts, in 1927 and a third in 
Natasket Beach, Massachusetts, 
the following year. He also started 
selling food items such as 
hamburgers and frankfurkrs a t  his 
original store. All three stores did 
well, but Johnson was still in debt 
and was not ready for expansion.' 
In 1929, Johnson opened a 
second restaurant in Quincy. This 
store had a broader menu and laid 
the groundwork for future expan- 
sion. However, with the oncoming 
depression, growth plans were put 
on hold while Johnson re-thought 
his vision. In his mind, the future of 
American eateries centered around 
the popularity of automobiles and 
improved  roadway^.^ His thinking 
was that Americans would take to 
the roads more and want good food 
along the way. 
Franchising is born 
In 1935, Howard Johnson 
teamed up with local busi- 
nessman Reginald Sprague and 
created the first modern-day 
restaurant franchise.-he idea 
was new in that day-let an oper- 
ator use the name, food, supplies, 
and logo, in exchange for a fee. By 
1941, the chain had grown to 150 
units and was poised for growth, 
most of which occurred along the 
Atlantic Coast, and into Florida.' 
The placing of restaurants on the 
route to Florida was especially 
strategic because travelers 
wanted a predictable meal a t  a 
predictable price." 
Howard Johnson faced a second 
crisis following the depression: 
World War 11. The impact on the 
chain was tremendous. Food 
rationing, gasoline restrictions, and 
less travel by Americans nearly 
forced the chain into bankruptcy? 
All but 10 of the 90 existing restau- 
rants were closed,'"but the 
company itself survived by catering 
to the military and schools. After 
the war, closed restaurants were 
reopened and new ones were built. 
Growth is in the East 
One of the f i s t  areas of growth 
was along the Pennsylvania Turn- 
pike, where restaurants were 
placed at approximately 50-mile 
intervals. Growth also continued 
with the franchising of stores in 
other areas, mostly in the eastern 
United States. The main concentra- 
tion of restaurants was in the 
greater Boston, New York City, and 
Philadelphia areas." 
By 1954, the chain boasted 400 
restaurants and was ready to enter 
the lodging industry. During this 
same year, Howard Johnson 
opened his f i s t  motel in Savannah, 
Georgia. The combination of a 
motel and restaurant on the same 
property proved popular as growth 
continued throughout the entire 
country, and on into Canada and 
Puerto Rico.IZ 
Johnson's son, Howard B. 
Johnson, took over the company in 
1959 and was given the charge by 
his father to "make it grow."I3 The 
restaurant chain topped the 1,000 
mark by the late 1970s, with about 
500 motor lodges as well. 
The 1980s proved to be critical 
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years to the chain." Competition 
from fast food restaurants ate away 
at market share and Howard 
Johnson's began to show a need for 
re-inventing itself. The company 
was sold in 1980 to a British fm, 
The Imperial Group, for $630 
million. The sale included 1,040 
restaurants and 520 motor lodges.'" 
The Imperial Gmup struggled to 
position the chain successfully in 
the competitive market of the 
1980s. Sales remained flat and 
operating income was dropping.'" 
In 1985, the company was sold 
again, this time to the Marriott 
Corporation." Marriott sold 199 
franchised restaurants and 
retained the 418 company stores, 
later converting them to its own 
"Bob's Big Boy" concept.'"M&oLt 
also sold all of the Howard 
Johnson's lodging units to Prime 
Motor Inns. In 1990, the lodging 
chain was sold to Blackstone Hospi- 
tality Franchise System.'" 
In 1986, a group of franchisees, 
concerned about the Maniott 
strategy of selling off or converting 
restaurants to other concepts, 
formed their own company called 
Franchise Associates, Inc. (FAI). 
Located in South Weymouth, 
Massachusetts, FA1 currently 
owns the right to operate the 
Howard Johnson name and 
product in relationship to the orig- 
inal restaurant concept. 
Howard Johnson's can be 
viewed in terms of two separate, yet 
related industries, restaurants and 
lodging. Today, the lodging side of 
the business, under the manage- 
ment of Cendant Corporation, is 
doing well.'" However, the restau- 
rant side struggles for survival. 
Marketing is success 
Howard Johnson's restaurants 
were placed in high traffic areas for 
greater visibility. The orange roof 
was meant to be an advertising logo 
in itself, one that could be seen from 
a distance?> The Simple Simon and 
the Pieman logo located on the 
large highway signs was a distinc- 
tive marketing ~uccess.2~ 
The placing of restaurants on 
the Pennsylvania Turnpike was 
another marketing s u c ~ e s s . ~  The 
turnpike was the first modern 
superhighway and Howard 
Johnson's was the first major 
restaurant chain. This marriage 
helped identify Johnson with 
"progressive engineering.*' Even- 
tually, the turnpike expansion 
included roadways in Connecticut, 
Illinois, Kansas, New Jersey, New 
York, Ohio, and Oklahoma."" 
Management mix varies 
The restaurant industry can be 
segmented in several ways for plan- 
ning and market research 
purposes?%e such depiction is 
illustrated in Table 1. The matrix 
segments service into three levels: 
low, medium, and high. Menu 
variety is also segmented into three 
levels of low, medium, and high. 
The type of eating establishment is 
placed in its corresponding box 
according to scnice level and menu 
variety. Howard Johnson's is repre- 
sented in the medium service, 
medium menu variety segment. 
During the 1970s, the majority of 
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Table 1 
Segmentation of restaurant industry 
Fast food 
service restaurants 
Drive-ins 
Medium Specialty 
Service restaurants 
Service IeveU I Low 
Diners 
Medium 
variety menu variety 
Cafeterias 
High 
variety variety 
Coffee shop & 
restaurants 
(Howard 
Johnson's) 
Casual-dining 
restaurants 
restaurants built were represented 
in the top two rows of the matrix. 
However, the 1980s and 1990s saw 
more chains expanding into the 
segments represented by the lower 
row of the matrix." 
The 1970s saw Howard 
Johnson's hit with competition 
from many fronts. Competition 
was especially strong from chains 
that focused on a particular niche 
such as Wendy's (hamburgers), 
Long John Silver's (seafood), or 
KFC (fried chicken). These firms 
are represented in the low service, 
low menu variety segment of Table 
1. Service from these chains was 
faster and prices were o h n  lower 
than what Howard Johnson's 
could offer2" 
In order to meet the competitive 
High 
Service 
challenge, Howard Johnson's diver- 
sified its appeal. In the 1970s, the 
chain opened the Ground Round, a 
more upscale concept, aimed at  the 
family market. By 1984, there were 
225 Ground Rounds operating, and 
most of them were profitable." In 
the 1980s, four other concepts were 
experimented with: Paddywacks, 
Bumbershoots, Pickle Lilys, and 
Deli Baker-Ice Cream Maker. 
Paddywacks was a coffee shop, 
while Bumbershoots and Pickle 
Lilys were designed to compete in 
the theme restaurant segment. 
Deli-Baker-Ice Cream Maker was 
an upscale deli with emphasis on 
take-out and premium beers.la 
These outlets were not widely 
successful, and enthusiasm for the 
restaurants eventually waned 
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the automobile age (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University 
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Concept 
restaurants 
Upscale dinner 
houses restaurants 
(gourmet) 
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when the Imperial Group revealed 
its plans in 1984 to dispose of the 
Howard Johnson's company" 
Various menu upgrades, long 
overdue, were undertaken at the 
original Howard Johnson's restau- 
rants during the 1980s. One of the 
key changes was to allow individual 
units to serve regional favorites. For 
example, pot roast was featured in 
the Northeast, while chicken and 
dumplings were sold in the South." 
As the 1990s approached, menus 
were also altered to include more 
healthy fare such as oat bran 
muffins, fresh fruit and yogurt plat- 
ters, and low cholesterol items. New 
items were added, including 
upscale salads and innovative ice 
cream  flavor^."^ 
Finance leads to growth 
Ironically, Howard Johnson 
started in business because he was 
in debt h m  a previous business 
venture. He started his first restau- 
rant in 1925 with $2,500 in wnrking 
capital to pay off a $42,000 debt."' 
Even as his chain was growing, he 
took his time paying back his mdi- 
tors. He once commented that his 
"suppliers were his creditors" and 
that "debts aren't anything to wony 
about if you can show the people you 
owe that you have a definite plan b 
pay them off, and if you look like a 
man with gumption enough to carry 
the plan through."" 
In 1935, Johnson wanted to 
grow his company, but lacked the 
necessary funds. Ironically, it was 
this dilemma that led to the 
massive franchising growth that 
followed. Lacking the cash needed 
to open a newrestaurant, he started 
&anchising aggressively. Initially, 
he was able to open one company 
store for every 10 franchised stores. 
In the late 1930s, this number had 
grown to two company stores for 
every 10 franchised units.3B By 
1940, the chain boasted 130 restau- 
r an t~ .~ '  Growth was strong in the 
1930s, but then, World War I1 
almost forced the company into 
bankruptcy. ARer the war, closed 
units were re-opened and new ones 
were built. Surviving a depression 
and a major world war prompted 
Johnson, and later his son, to be 
conservative in matters of cash 
flow.""ohnson had been in debt in 
hs early years of growing the chain, 
and he did not want to be plagued 
by it later on. As a result, the 
company grew in the 1950s and 
1960s through cash flow from oper- 
ations, rather than by taking on 
debt. By the 1970s, the company 
had cash reserves of $90 milli~n."~ 
Working manager is key 
The "working manager" 
concept was used a t  Howard 
Johnson's  restaurant^.^ Managers 
were expected to perform manual 
labor and pitch in as needed. 
Cutting labor cost was a priority at 
the unit level; therefore, managers 
were expected to work side by side 
with employees in order to keep the 
number of employees a t  a 
minimum. 
Bonuses to managers were paid 
on the basis of cutting costs."' 
Managerial salaries were generally 
below market, and hours were long. 
Because of these conditions, gradu- 
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ates of hotel and restaurant schools 
were apprehensive about careers 
with Howard Johnson's. 
The elder Howard Johnson's 
style of management was one of 
fear and intimidation. His son, 
Howard B. Johnson, once 
commented, "He never took a 
breath for 40 years, and he didn't 
think much of anybody who did. He 
was aggressive and demanding, but 
if you kept step with him, he was a 
very big supporter."" 
Layout, design fit format 
The restaurant typi6ed what is 
known as the coffee shop style of 
layout. It represented a merger of a 
soda fountain on one side of the 
building with a more formal dining 
room on the other."Desserts and 
ice cream were assembled from the 
counter, while regular menu items 
were processed in the kitchen. 
Customers entered through a 
vestibule and were greeted by a 
host or hostess in the center of the 
building. A cash register and ice 
cream displays were located in this 
small waiting area, with the 
counter with stool-type seats at the 
right. To the left was the dining 
room with booths or tables with 
chairs. Some restaurants had addi- 
tional dining rooms added on to the 
side of the building where the main 
dining room was located. 
The decor of the restaurant 
featured the orange roof and blue 
and white sign. Aweathervane was 
perched on the roof and the Simple 
Simon and the Pieman logo 
adorned the entrance of the 
building. Although various building 
styles existed, most still followed 
the coffee shop format. In the 1990s, 
design changes with the building 
and interior took place with the aim 
of reflecting a more modem look. 
The orange roof remains, but new 
color schemes were added to 
include white, orange, and teal 
blue. An updated store in Canton, 
Massachusetts, included a trian- 
gular arch over the entrance with 
colorful banners and flags." 
Operations stress control 
Howard Johnson's used a 
commissary approach to supplying 
its restaurants, thus reflecting a 
degree of vertical integration. 
Food items were originally 
produced in a manufacturing 
facility in Wollaston, Massachu- 
setts, and then trucked to indi- 
vidual restaurants where they 
were "finished by short order 
cooks. This approach was utilized 
in order to keep consistency and 
control uniform over a large 
geographical area.a It  also offered 
the advantage of economies of 
scale which helped reduce costs." 
As the chain expanded, more 
commissaries were built. It  was 
the commissaries - not the restau- 
rants - that eventually turned out 
to be the most profitable part of 
the business." 
The items delivered to restau- 
rants were mostly in h z e n  form 
and included ice cream and entrees. 
At the restaurant, cooks used a 
short order approach to food prepa- 
ration. Only three main methods of 
food preparation prevailed at the 
unit level: fiyhg, baking, and grid- 
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dling.'"eep fat fryers were used 
on the famous clams and fish 
items, as well as French fries. 
Ovens and microwaves heated up 
frozen items and steam tables kept 
food warm. Grills were used to 
prepare the well-known frank- 
furters. as well as hambureers. 
., 
Expensive labor was not needed in 
the kitchen since the actual recipes 
were prepared at the commissary. 
Operations at  the unit level of 
the restaurant were highly system- 
ized. The "Howard Johnson Bible" 
outlined all rules and procedures on 
how to run the restaurant."' Later, 
Ray Kroc would follow this practice 
of operating "by the book" in the 
running of McDonald's. 
Lessons are learned 
Howard Johnson's definitely 
did many things right. Although a 
number of lessons can be learned 
from this successful chain, there 
are four that are prominent. 
First model: The Howard 
Johnson's franchise system offered 
the first model of how a successful 
restaurant chain should grow. The 
restaurant franchise success 
formula began with Howard 
Johnson's. Although there were 
other franchises available in the 
food service industry, Howard 
Johnson's was the first to expand to 
such a large size. What made the 
chain successful was its emphasis 
on consistency and proper location 
of stores. The orange roof, the same 
menu in each restaurant, and the 
placing of restaurants at high 
traffic locations all contributed to 
franchise success. 
His son, Howard B. Johnson, 
commented, "He was the first 
person to realize there was very 
limited food service on the U. S. 
highways. He also realized early on 
you should develop a product line 
that was consistent so people would 
trust it,"5o 
Alternate markets: A com- 
pany can survive during critical 
times by looking for alternate 
markets. Howard Johnson can be 
credited as one of the &st entre- 
preneurs to think "outside the box." 
When faced with debt and the 
perilous years of the depression, he 
viewed the kanchise relationship 
as an innovative solution. When 
faced with massive eas rationing. 
and the problems of world War G; 
he sold his products to alternate 
markets, i.e., the military. After the 
elder Howard Johnson's retire- 
ment, his son continued his legacy 
by expanding the chain rapidly and 
looking at markets outside the 
coffee shop restaurant segment. 
The Ground Round and Red Coach 
Grill concepts were successful 
attempts at diversification within 
the restaurant industry. 
Consistency: Consistency of 
operations is necessary for 
successful chain expansion. 
Although taken for granted today, 
Howard Johnson's was the first 
major chain to illustrate the need 
for a consistent level of service and 
product quality? Predictab'ity was 
important to the traveling public 
during the 1950s and 1960s. Few 
restaurants at the t i e  offered a 
consistent product and service over 
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such a wide geographical area. 
Whiie it is tme that modern chains 
like McDonald's have since taken 
this concept to new heights, the 
core competency of consistent 
product delivery was initiated with 
Howard Johnson's. 
Success multiplies: The 
success of one chain can lead to the 
b i i  and expansion of other chains. 
The success of Howard Johnson's 
directly led to the expansion of 
Dunkin Donuts. William Rosen- 
burg, founder of Dunkin Donuts, 
once commented, "I saw what he 
(Howard Johnson) was doing with 
franchising and thought it was such 
a good idea; he became the impetus 
for me. The only guy I saw move so 
fast was Howard Johnson. He was 
the No. 1 food operation in the early 
1950s and had been going since the 
1930s."" Other chains, motivated 
by the lure of success, entered the 
restaurant industry and expanded 
aggressively. McDonald's, Burger 
King, Denny's, and others soon 
found that they could compete and 
expand in a growing competitive 
market. 
Lessons learned from fall 
Unfortunately for Howard 
Johnson's, its most powerful 
lessons are derived from its decline. 
Four are especially noteworthy. 
Success not ensured: Past 
success does not ensure future 
success and can actually lead to 
demise. When Howard Johnson's 
was at its peak in growth, few 
would have suggested that the 
chain might someday have fewer 
than 60 restaurants. After all, 
Howard Johnson's represented an 
American success story with 
humble roots beginning in 1925. 
The company was a symbol of how 
a hardworking entrepreneur could 
be successful in America. Howard 
B. Johnson once commented, "I've 
met a handful of smart men in my 
lifetime, and he was one of the 
brightest I ever met. He was an 
American entrepreneur, one of the 
fellas that helped build this country. 
This country breeds these types of 
people, and thank God it does."" 
Nonetheless, the chain fell and 
fell hard. Critics of the chain noted 
that for years the company was not 
innovating or responding to 
changes in the industry."' Are there 
large restaurant chains today that 
could follow suit? One would ques- 
tion whether successful ventures 
like McDonald's, Wendy's, or 
Denny's could ever fad. Indeed, 
back in the 1960s, many probably 
thought it would never happen to 
Howard Johnson's either. 
The success of Howard 
Johnson's revolutionized the 
restaurant, lodging, and franchise 
delivery systems. It also brought on 
a new threat, competition. With 
Howard Johnson's as a role model, 
other chains soon entered the 
industry and created a crowded and 
competitive environment. Soon, 
only the strongest companies 
survived. Herein lies one of the 
ironies of the marketplace; impres- 
sive success can lead to organiza- 
tional decline."" 
Indeed, the list of successful 
restaurant chains which ran into 
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trouble is a long one, and would also 
include such names as Rax, Chi- 
Chi's, Steak & Ale, Checkers, and 
Sambds?6 In the case of Howard 
Johnson's, the chain grew to more 
than 1,000 units in ihe 1970s. 
Howard Johnson motels, which 
were adjacent to many restaurants, 
helped ensure a steady source of 
customers. This comfortable 
arrangement, plus a good brand 
name in the eyes of the public, led 
to an "it can't happen to us" atti- 
tude. Decline resulted when new 
competition entered the market- 
place and the chain failed to adjust 
to these changes. 
Management complacency is a 
serious problem for many 
successful organizations. When 
things are going well, decision 
makers tend not to critically assess 
problem areas that could lead to 
future problems."' As PinPB put it, 
"Fix it even if it's not broken" is an 
axiom that is inherent to the 
restaurant business. 
Reinvestment necessary: 
Reinvesting profits into the organi- 
zation is fundamental to meeting 
the demands of a changing market. 
Howard Johnson was weary of 
debt. He started the company in 
debt and franchised because he did 
not have cash to expand. The result 
in later years was a conservative 
approach to management by 
building up large cash reserves and 
not spending it on innovation. This 
approach proved to be instrumental 
in the downfall of the chain. 
Without investments in the 
changing market, the chain 
watched helplessly as the competi- 
tion passes them by. Baskin 
Robbins took market share away 
because Howard Johnson's did not 
expand into downtown ice cream 
parlors. Stouffers took away busi- 
ness from the commissary frozen 
food side of the company because 
Howard Johnson's did not want to 
invest additional money.5g 
The situation was worse in the 
actual restaurant industry. 
Competitors like McDonald's, Long 
John Silver, and KFC came in with 
better quality products at lower 
prices. Instead of battling the 
competition, Howard Johnson's 
chose to stand still with the same 
menu and same concept that had 
existed for years. This strategy 
could not have come at a worse 
time. The restaurant industry was 
expanding and competition was 
heavy The result was a shakeout of 
weaker competitors. Smaller 
chains collapsed altogether, while 
large chains like ~ o w a r d  johnson's 
shrank dramatically. 
Value needed: Failure to 
provide value and an overemphasis 
on cost cutting can drive away 
customers. During the 1960s and 
70s, Howard Johnson's became 
more focused on real estate, bottom 
line profits, and  stockholder^.^" 
While these factors are essential to 
running a restaurant chain, the 
overemphasis led to lost customers. 
The quality of food, service, and 
cleanliness declined, which led to a 
loss in market  hare.^' 
Restaurants were asked to 
squeeze payroll, consewe water by 
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letting the customer ask for it, and 
removing pla~emats.~"ven the 
competition noticed the pre-occupa- 
tion with cost cutting. '%very time I 
saw Howard Johnson he was 
always telling me how he was going 
to cut costs further," remarked one 
competitor. "I don't think he spent 
enough time at his restaurants. If 
he'd eaten in his own restaurants 
more instead of lunching at '21 ,' he 
might have learned ~omething."~ 
In many respects, delivering 
value simply refers to doing the 
basics well. Like other restaurant 
chains that experienced similar 
dilKculties, Howard Johnson's food 
quality depreciated over time, and 
"menu fatigue" resulted &om the 
lack of enhancement of food offer- 
i n g ~ . ~  The overemphasis on cost 
containment resulted in decreased 
speed, professionalism, and restau- 
rant ambiance. 
Competitiveness needed: 
Ultimately, a company must 
develop the appropriate business 
strategy in order to stay competi- 
tive. From the founding of the 
company until the late 1960s, 
Howard Johnson's was operating in 
the right market niche - the coffee- 
housdfamily restaurant segment of 
the industry. But as the 1970s 
progressed, the company was 
suffering with aging restaurants 
and a decaying market niche.66 
Efforts were made to expand into 
more sophisticated markets with 
Red Coach Grills and Ground 
Round restaurants. On the whole, 
these efforts were successful. 
In the 1970s, Howard Johnson's 
was reorganized into two restau- 
rant divisions, the Orange Roof and 
the Specialty Restaurant Divi- 
sion.' The Orange Roof Division 
consisted of Howard Johnson's 
restaurants, New Edition, The 
Choice if Yours, Turnpike Unites, 
and Truck Stops. The Specialty 
Restaurant Division consisted of 
Ground Round, Red Coach Grills, 
and a concept called Lucky Lil's.AU 
were upscale concepts that focused 
more on higher check averages and 
liquor sales. 
In spite of the diversification 
attempts, the company could not 
seem to implement a coherent 
strategy. Howard B. Johnson was 
worried about repositioning the 
company as the 1980s approached."' 
He admitted that changes were 
taking place, but he was not really 
sure where the industry was 
heading. Johnson commented: 
We all want the dinner business, 
but you have those horrible 
margins involved in putting out 
the plate. So we have to sell a lot 
of liquor, but in a coffee shop you 
can't sell more than seven or 
eight percent liquor. I don't have 
the key yet. I'm sure that we're 
making the right long-term 
mwes, but I don't have the key 
to shrinldng return on invest- 
ment or profit margins yet." 
The core problem was simple: 
the skills required to execute an 
effective external growth and devel- 
opment strategy differ from those 
required to implement an internal 
strategy. External growth places 
greater strains on internal capital 
and requires expertise in other 
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industry segments. Howard 
Johnson's was not prepared to meet 
this challenge. 
Clearly, there was a strategy, 
but without the heart. The commit- 
ment to a single direction was 
lacking. The company expanded 
into new markets, but its core 
competency - the coffee shoplfamily 
dining segment - was left in sham- 
bles. Yet it was this segment which 
represented the bulk of revenues, 
and it quickly slid as the 1980s 
progressed. Hence, Howard 
Johnson's developed into a classic 
case of a company that was "stuck 
in the middle.nsB 
Howard Johnson's provides 
researchers, practitioners, and 
students with an excellent opportu- 
nity to study an organization that 
once revolutionized an industry 
segment and later spiraled down- 
ward in decline. Inherent in the 
issues is the idea that organiza- 
tionalsuccess is a temporal concept, 
and yesterday's achievements ulti- 
mately have little to do with 
tomorrow's performance. These 
lessons are especially noteworthy in 
today's fast-paced business envi- 
ronment where both business star- 
tups and dissolutions are occurring 
at record paces. Indeed, history will 
remember Howard Johnson's for 
both its success and failures. 
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